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DELIVER US FROM EVIL:  WHY BANKRUPTCY 
JUDGES MAY PROPERLY RELY ON THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE & RFRA TO PROTECT 
CHURCH PROPERTY FROM THE GRASPS OF 
TORT-CREDITORS 
Nicholas M. Gaunce∗ 
Robert Luther III∗∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In January of 2002, the Boston Globe reported that the Boston 
Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church had knowingly transferred 
at least one sexually abusive priest between several parishes within the 
region.1  This report lit a powder keg of sexual abuse allegations against 
Roman Catholic clergy throughout the country.2  Reports have indicated 
that the Catholic Church has spent over a billion dollars to settle claims 
brought by alleged sexual abuse victims.3  As a result of this unexpected 
                                                 
∗ Associate, Post & Schell, P.C., Princeton, New Jersey; Law Clerk to the Honorable 
William E. Nugent, New Jersey Superior Court–Law Division (2007–08); J.D. 2007, Ohio 
Northern University Pettit College of Law, with high distinction; B.A. 2003, University of 
New Hampshire.  Mr. Gaunce, whose scholarship on the First Amendment has previously 
been published in the Ohio Northern University Law Review, can be reached at 
NicholasMGaunce@gmail.com. 
∗ ∗ Associate, Knicely & Associates, P.C., Williamsburg, Virginia; Former Litigation 
Fellow, Pacific Legal Foundation (2007); J.D. 2006, Ohio Northern University Pettit College 
of Law; B.A. 2003, Hampden-Sydney College, magna cum laude.  Mr. Luther, whose 
scholarship on Constitutional Law and the First Amendment has previously been 
published in the Santa Clara Law Review the UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy, 
and the George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal, can be reached at 
RobLuther@gmail.com. 
1 Daniel J. Marcinak, Comment, Separation of Church and Estate:  On Excluding Parish 
Assets from the Bankruptcy Estate of a Diocese Organized as a Corporation Sole, 55 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 583, 584 n.10 (2006) (citing Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at A1).  However, the genesis of parish closings in and around 
Boston actually antedates the scandal.  See Kathy McCabe, As Parishes Close, Survivors Plot 
Future, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1998, at 4 (discussing, in 1998, the Archdiocesan plans to 
close several dozen parishes through “2008 because of declining attendance and shrinking 
numbers of clergy[]”); see also The Boston Globe, http://www.boston.com/globe/ 
spotlight/abuse/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (discussing relevant issues regarding the 
Catholic Church sex abuse scandal, including internal church documents, victim letters, 
financial cost analysis, and various links to news stories). 
2 Marcinak, supra note 1, at 584. 
3 Id. at n.12 (citing Rachel Zoll, Sex Abuse-Related Costs Top $ 1 Billion, MIAMI HERALD, 
June 10, 2005, at A1, 2005 WLNR 9200385) (explaining that between 2002 and mid-2005, the 
church spent at least $378 million defending against sex-abuse claims). 
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financial upheaval, several dioceses threatened to file for bankruptcy.4  
However, the first dioceses to actually file Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petitions were the dioceses of Tucson, Arizona; Portland, Oregon; and 
Spokane, Washington.5 
From a bankruptcy law perspective, “[b]ecause no American diocese 
had ever filed for bankruptcy protection, this area of the law involve[d] 
totally uncharted waters.”6  Therefore, when claims of clergy abuse arose 
in the states of Oregon and Washington,7  bankruptcy courts in these 
jurisdictions were required to determine whether property titled in the 
name of the diocese, but held in trust for parishes within the dioceses, 
could be excluded from the bankruptcy estate of the diocese on First 
Amendment or Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”), grounds.8  
Both courts held that neither the First Amendment nor RFRA barred 
including parish property in the estate of the diocese.9  In effect, the 
courts required churches to abide by secular principles of law when 
holding church property.10 
                                                 
4 Id. at 585. 
5 Id.  See also 7-1100 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
§ 1100.01 (15th ed. rev. 2006).  Collier describes the basic Chapter 11 policies as follows: 
 Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an opportunity for a 
debtor to reorganize its business or financial affairs or to engage in an 
orderly liquidation of its property.  It is fashioned primarily for 
business debtors, although individuals who are not engaged in 
businesses qualify for relief under Chapter 11. 
 Chapter 11 embodies a policy that it is generally preferable to 
enable a debtor to continue to operate and to reorganize its business 
rather than simply to liquidate a troubled business.  Continued 
operation may enable the debtor to preserve any positive difference 
between the going concern value of the business and the liquidation 
value.  Moreover, continued operation can save the jobs of employees, 
the tax base of communities, and generally reduce the upheaval that 
can result from termination of a business. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
6 Marcinak, supra note 1, at 585 (citing Eli Sanders, Catholics Puzzle over a Bankruptcy 
Filing, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2004, at A17) (quoting Bud Bunce, communications director for 
the Archdiocese of Portland) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
7 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005); 
In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), overruled by 
Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006)). 
8 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 860; In re the Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 324. 
9 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. 868; In re the Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 325. 
10 Id.; see also Joseph A. Rohner IV, Comment, Catholic Diocese Sexual Abuse Suits, 
Bankruptcy, and Property of the Bankruptcy Estate:  Is the “Pot of Gold” Really Empty?, 84 OR. L. 
REV. 1181 (2005) (detailing the civil law protections available to church entities). 
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This Article challenges the Oregon Bankruptcy Court’s decision in In 
re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland and the Washington Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision in In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane.  Specifically, it 
argues that there are two separate bases for bankruptcy judges to utilize 
a heightened level of scrutiny for the process of liquidation when they 
apply traditional legal principles to render decisions that will 
substantially affect church property.  To logically reach this point, this 
Article is subdivided into several parts.  First, Part II traces a line of 
Supreme Court decisions on church property disputes implicating Free 
Exercise Clause concerns in the context of religious practices.11  Next, 
Part III explains basic principles of bankruptcy law and analyzes the 
decisions of the Oregon and Washington Bankruptcy Courts.12  Part IV 
challenges the application of Employment Division v. Smith’s13 general rule 
for the resolution of bankruptcy disputes; in particular, this Article 
asserts that the bankruptcy system is one of individualized exemptions, 
which requires bankruptcy courts to apply strict scrutiny to the process 
of liquidation when deciding matters affecting church property, and 
argues that RFRA does not apply to bankruptcy judges when making 
state law determinations.14  Finally, this Article asserts that RFRA applies 
to bankruptcy judges based on Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy 
Clause of Article I of the Constitution. 
The authors hope this Article will provide an analytical framework 
for future cases in which bankruptcy judges are confronted with tort-
creditor suits that have resulted in judgments against religious entities. 
II.  UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND CONGRESSIONAL 
RESPONSE 
Two lines of precedent must be examined before the decisions of the 
Washington and Oregon Bankruptcy Courts can be properly analyzed.  
Beginning with Watson v. Jones, Part II.A discusses what has been 
identified as the “church property” cases.15  Next, Part II.B discusses the 
                                                 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part III. 
13 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) 
(holding that neutral laws of general applicability may be upheld despite an incidental 
burden on the practice of one’s religion). 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 Watson v. Jones and its progeny include:  Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Kedroff v. 
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Jones v. 
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
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Supreme Court’s decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny, which 
involved state-imposed burdens on the exercise of religious freedom.16 
A. The “Church Property” Cases 
The “church property” cases make it clear that the Court has often 
struggled to balance the needs of the secular and religious worlds when 
tasked with adjudicating church property disputes.  The need to balance 
first arose in 1872 with Watson v. Jones.17  Watson involved a divided 
Kentucky Presbyterian congregation that had battled over the ownership 
of church belongings.18  Specifically, the division in the congregation 
stemmed from a disagreement over the treatment of individuals who 
had previously owned slaves or served in the Confederate army during 
the Civil War.19  The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had 
officially disavowed slavery and declared that those members who still 
professed a belief in slavery did not reflect the “true Presbytery[.]”20 
The Supreme Court held that the right of religious freedom included 
the right to organize religious bodies to decide questions of faith.21  In 
addition, the Court held that once a hierarchical church body had 
decided a matter of internal faith, civil courts were bound to show 
deference to that decision.22  Applying this rule to the dispute, the Court 
concluded that the General Assembly’s decision was binding on civil 
courts.23  Therefore, the property at issue belonged to the church 
congregants whom the General Assembly considered to be true 
members.24 
Although “[t]he clear effect of Watson was to limit the role of the 
courts in the resolutions of disputes over church property”25, when the 
opportunity arose in Jones v. Wolf,26 the Court reconsidered the deference 
it had previously shown to the church decision-making body in Watson 
and suggested a second constitutionally permissible method for 
resolving intra-faith property disputes.  This approach evolved from the 
                                                 
16 Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny include:  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); and Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment 
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
17 Watson, 80 U.S. at 679. 
18 Id. at 681. 
19 Id. at 690–92. 
20 Id. at 692. 
21 Id. at 729. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 727. 
24 Id. at 692. 
25 Paul Finkelman, ed. Religion in American Law: An Encyclopedia, “Departure from 
Doctrine” by Davison  M. Douglas & James K. Lehman, 135 (1999). 
26 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
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seed planted by the Court just three years earlier in Presbyterian Church in 
the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church,27 a case which actually affirmed many of the principles of Watson 
and held that the civil trial judge had overstepped his authority by 
charging the jury to draw interpretations and conclusions significantly 
interwoven with church doctrine.28 
Jones involved an intra-congregational dispute regarding separation 
from a governing authority.29  Members of the local congregation were 
divided over the decision to separate.30  In response to the division, the 
congregation’s higher authority enacted a commission that issued a 
written ruling declaring the minority faction, who favored continuing a 
relationship with the higher authority, the true congregation.31  
Following the ruling, the minority faction brought suit in federal court 
seeking exclusive possession of the disputed church property.32 
To resolve this controversy, the Jones Court applied the “neutral-
principles approach” which had been first mentioned in Hull.33  Under 
this approach, secular courts are allowed to resolve internal church 
disputes by applying neutral principles of trust or property law.34  Given 
this holding, courts can apply general legal principles to church deeds, 
charters, and constitutions.35  Today, the Jones decision stands for the 
proposition that a civil court may set aside decisions made by a 
congregation with regard to its internal affairs if the decision affects 
church property and the court applies “neutral principles” of trust or 
property law in determining the distribution of church assets.36  Today, 
the specific limitations from Jones remain undefined, as Justice Powell 
predicted in his dissent.37  Nevertheless, it is important to keep these 
                                                 
27  Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Hospital, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).  
28 Id. 
29 Jones, 443 U.S. at 597. 
30 Id. at 598. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 604. 
34 Id. at 603. 
35 Id. at 604. 
36 Jones, 443 U.S. at 610 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court appears to accept 
established principles that I have thought would resolve this case, it superimposes on these 
principles a new structure of rules that will make the decision of these cases by civil courts 
more difficult.  The new analysis also is more likely to invite intrusion into church polity 
forbidden by the First Amendment.”). 
37 See Jeffrey B. Hassler, Comment, A Multitude of Sins?  Constitutional Standards for Legal 
Resolution of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35 
PEPP. L. REV. 399, 428–29 (2008) (stating that “the neutral-principles doctrine may not be the 
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cases in mind as we contemplate the role of the bankruptcy judge in the 
context of tort-creditor claimants who demand the distribution of church 
property to satisfy a judgment. 
B. Sherbert:  The Pinnacle of Free Exercise 
In addition to Watson, Hull, and Jones, Sherbert v. Verner38 and its 
progeny provide other principles for consideration.  In Sherbert, a 
Seventh-Day Adventist was fired from her job after refusing to work on 
Saturday, her Sabbath.39  When Mrs. Sherbert applied for state 
unemployment compensation, her application was denied because her 
religious objection to working on Saturday did not create “good cause” 
for her refusal to work.40  The Supreme Court disagreed with this denial 
and held that Mrs. Sherbert was entitled to unemployment 
compensation.41  The Court reasoned that the government placed a 
substantial burden on Mrs. Sherbert’s religious freedom by requiring her 
to make a choice between forfeiting government benefits and violating a 
central tenet of her faith.42  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
announced that the government had to meet the standard of strict 
scrutiny if it planned to deny applicants religious exemptions from 
facially-neutral laws.43 
This standard, however, was substantially modified in Employment 
Division v. Smith.44  Smith, a Native American, was seeking state 
unemployment compensation after being fired for ingesting peyote—a 
criminally banned substance in the state of Oregon—during a Native 
American religious ceremony.45  The Supreme Court effectively 
overruled Sherbert in holding that Smith was not entitled to an 
exemption from the Oregon drug law because that law was a neutral law 
of general applicability and not subject to the exacting review of strict 
scrutiny.46 
                                                                                                             
panacea” of all church property issues as anticipated by the majority in Jones[]”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
38 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
39 Id. at 399. 
40 Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 Id. at 402. 
42 Id. at 406. 
43 Id. at 406 (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies 
the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right.”).  A similar broad 
protection of religious freedom was recognized in Yoder, where the Court held that Amish 
children were not required to attend the ninth and tenth grade despite Wisconsin’s 
compulsory attendance law.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972). 
44 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
45 Id. at 874. 
46 Id. at 890. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/5
2009] Bankruptcy Courts and Church Property 647 
In 1993, Congress responded to the Smith ruling by enacting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”), in an attempt to restore 
the Sherbert holding.47  Under RFRA, in order for one to assert a valid 
free exercise claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a government 
regulation “substantially burden[s]” his or her religious practice.48  Once 
the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the government must assert a 
compelling interest to support its regulation.49  Despite this landmark 
congressional response, in the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the 
Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state laws, 
based on federalism and separation of powers concerns.50 
III.  THE PRELUDE TO THE DECISIONS OF THE OREGON AND WASHINGTON 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 
This Part provides an overview of the traditional scope of the 
bankruptcy estate and briefly explains how church property is 
traditionally held by a Catholic diocese.51  In light of this discussion, the 
decisions of In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland and In re the 
Catholic Bishop of Spokane are then analyzed.52 
A. The Bankruptcy Estate and the Trust Exception 
Now that controlling precedent has been reviewed, it is appropriate 
to briefly review the recent decisions of the Washington and Oregon 
Bankruptcy Courts.  At issue in both cases was the application of Section 
541 of the Bankruptcy Code which governs the scope of the bankruptcy 
estate.53  In fact, this provision embodies one of the basic principles 
supporting bankruptcy law.54  In short, after a debtor files a petition, 
Section 541 creates a separate estate that holds the debtor’s property 
interests during the administration of the bankruptcy case.55  This 
provision serves to centralize the debtor’s property interests by requiring 
creditors to receive satisfaction of their debts through a single court.56  To 
                                                 
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
48 Id. § 2000bb-1(a). 
49 Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
50 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
51 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
52 See infra Parts III.B.1–2 
53 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2005). 
54 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 541.01 (declaring that “Section 541 embodies the 
essence of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
55 51 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 51:3 (2d ed. 
2006). 
56 Id. 
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meet this end, Section 541 broadly defines the term “property of the 
estate[.]”57  In relevant part, this section explicitly states:  the bankruptcy 
estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case . . . wherever located and by 
whomever held[.]”58  In plain English, the estate includes any interest, 
wherever that interest is located.59 
Section 541’s scope, however, is not unlimited.  In fact, the provision 
lists six categories of property that are excluded from a bankruptcy 
estate.60  The particular exception at issue in both of the aforementioned 
church-property bankruptcy cases was § 541(d).  This section excludes, 
from the bankruptcy estate, property in which the debtor “holds, as of 
the commencement of the case, only legal title and not an equitable 
interest[.]”61  It was precisely this provision of the Bankruptcy Code that 
both the Oregon and Washington dioceses relied upon to support their 
position that church property should be excluded from the estate 
because the parish—not the diocese—was the equitable owner of the 
property. 
B. The Corporation Sole and Canon Law 
Before evaluating the position of the dioceses, it is important to note 
that the exclusion proposition presented by the church had a legitimate 
basis in current church structure and Canon Law.  Regarding church 
structure, Catholic dioceses are either modeled in corporation sole or 
corporation aggregate form.62  Both the Oregon and Washington 
dioceses adopted the corporate sole structure.63  This structure is unique 
because it consists of one individual and his or her successors, by virtue 
of an office position, assuming the legal capacity of a corporation.64  The 
focus of this model is to fashion an “official trusteeship” whereby one 
central entity, such as a bishop or diocese, holds purely legal title to 
church property and several constituent entities, such as parishes, enjoy 
                                                 
57 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2005). 
58 Id. § 541(a)(1). 
59 See id.; Norton, supra note 55, at § 51:1. 
60 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 541.01. 
61 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2005). 
62 Felicia Anne Nadborny, Note, “Leap of Faith” into Bankruptcy:  An Examination of the 
Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese’s Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 839, 848 (2005).  
63 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 860 (Bankr. D. Or. 
2005); In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 324 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), 
overruled by Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. 
Wash. 2006). 
64 1 JAMES D. COX, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 1.19 (2d ed. 1995). 
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an equitable interest in that property.65  In essence, this structure imposes 
a model whereby the central authority holds property on behalf of the 
constituency, and a trust is created for the benefit of the congregation’s 
constituency.66 
This is hardly a novel concept; the church often holds property in 
trust for its congregation.  In fact, this concept is rooted in Canon Law 
and arises from a very pragmatic purpose.  The corporate sole structure 
developed as a way for parishes to restrict the diocese from controlling 
property that the parish purchased separately.67  Under this structure, if 
a diocese attempted to subrogate parish property, Canon Law would be 
violated.68  Essentially, Canon Law recognizes each individual parish as 
a separate legal entity.69  More importantly, however, Canon Law 
recognizes that once a parish acquires assets with separate funds and in 
a separate capacity, the diocese is required to respect this separate 
acquisition and restrain itself from claiming an interest in the acquired 
property.70  Despite this recognition, neither the Washington nor the 
Oregon Bankruptcy Court was responsive to these acknowledgements 
during litigation. 
In each case, a local archdiocese filed a voluntary bankruptcy 
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.71  Both dioceses listed 
parish property as property held in trust for another entity, namely the 
parishes themselves.72  In response to this listing, the Tort Claimants’ 
Committee filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that 
parish property was included within the diocese bankruptcy estate.73  In 
both cases, the church, focusing on section 541(d), argued that the 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW (Revised) 175 (2004); see also 
CODE OF CANON LAW c.1255 (stating that “[t]he universal Church and the Apostolic See, 
the particular churches as well as any other juridic person, whether public or private, are 
capable of acquiring, retaining, administering[,] and alienating temporal goods in accord 
with the norm of law[]”). 
68 Coriden, supra note 67, at 175. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.; see also CODE OF CANON LAW C. 1256 (stating that “[t]he right of ownership over 
goods under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff belongs to that juridic person 
which has lawfully acquired them[]”). 
71 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 848 (Bankr. D. Or. 
2005); In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), 
overruled by Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. 
Wash. 2006)). 
72 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 848; In re the Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 310. 
73 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 850; In re the Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 310. 
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parish—not the diocese—was the equitable owner of parish property.74  
Both courts rejected this argument, holding that parish property was 
included in the bankruptcy estate.75  Furthermore, the courts rejected a 
religious freedom defense to the proceeding which was presented by the 
church in each respective case.76 
1. The Oregon Bankruptcy Court Decision  
In the Oregon litigation, the Portland diocese argued, based on a 
First Amendment claim, that the court should “apply internal church 
law to determine what is property of the bankruptcy estate.”77  The 
court, relying on Jones, held that neutral principles of state law could be 
applied to determine whether church property was included in the 
bankruptcy estate.78  In so holding, the court clearly stated that 
“consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence and the Bankruptcy 
Code, [we] will apply neutral secular principles of state law[.]”79 
However, the RFRA argument that the Portland diocese put forth 
garnered a lengthier discussion of applicable principles from the court.  
After stating the prevailing standards, the court asserted that RFRA did 
not apply to § 541 determinations.80  In fact, the court’s position was that 
bankruptcy judges are unrestrained by RFRA when making estate 
determinations because the reviewing judge applies state law to render 
those decisions.81  However, the court, to further its analysis, assumed 
that RFRA would apply.82 
In this decision, the court did not extend its holding beyond the 
initial hurdle which required that the church prove a substantial burden 
on its religious freedom.  The court explicitly stated that “[i]t is hard to 
understand how the court’s determination of what constitutes property 
of the bankruptcy estate under § 541 could impose a substantial burden 
on the exercise of religion.”83  In other words, as long as secular law 
provided the church an opportunity to hold property in a manner that 
                                                 
74 Nadborny, supra note 62, at 850–53. 
75 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 868; In re the Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333. 
76 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 850; In re the Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 310. 
77 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 853. 
78 Id. at 852. 
79 Id. at 854. 
80 Id. at 861. 
81 Id. at 860. 
82 Id. at 860–61. 
83 Id. at 861. 
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honored its religious tenets, no burden on religious practice was 
imposed.84 
2. The Washington Bankruptcy Court Decision 
Like the Oregon court, the Washington Bankruptcy Court was 
unreceptive to the church’s arguments.  There, the church took the firm 
stance and argued that the application of civil law, to any extent, would 
interfere with the free exercise of religion.85  To support this theory, the 
Spokane bishop first raised the “church property” line of cases.  In 
response, the bankruptcy court noted the potential application of this 
precedent to the present dispute, but distinguished the cases.86  First, the 
court reasoned that the “church property” cases involved intra-church 
disputes, and, by contrast, the instant case involved a dispute between 
the church and third-party tort victims.87  Here, the court determined 
that deference to church autonomy was not warranted in a third-party 
creditor-church relationship.88 
In addition, the Washington court considered the application of 
Smith and RFRA.  In this portion of its analysis, the reviewing judge 
focused on determining whether the application of § 541 of the 
Bankruptcy Code imposed a substantial burden on the church’s free 
exercise of religion—just as the Oregon court had done.89  However, 
unlike the Oregon court, the Washington court emphasized that the 
church was engaging in a secular activity.90  Based on this distinction, the 
Washington court explicitly noted that “[r]eligious organizations do not 
exist on some ethereal plane far removed from society[,]”91 but that the 
church engages in secular activities, such as defaulting on a mortgage, 
like other non-religious debtors.92  To the Washington court, a 
bankruptcy petition is a secular activity, regardless of whether it is filed 
by an individual or a church.  Because this law would be applicable to 
any other similarly-situated debtor, the court explained that there is no 
                                                 
84 Id. at 862. 
85 In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 322 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), 
overruled by Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. 
Wash. 2006)). 
86 Id. at 322–23. 
87 Id. at 323. 
88 Id. 
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burden that would give rise to a RFRA claim by the application of this 
particular law to the church.93 
IV.  WHY THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND RFRA APPLY TO BANKRUPTCY 
Consideration of both the Oregon and Washington cases makes it 
clear that both dioceses were unsuccessful in persuading the bankruptcy 
court to adopt either the church-property or free exercise line of 
precedent; ipso facto, both courts were unreceptive to the argument that 
decisions issued by bankruptcy judges which allocate church property as 
the result of civil misconduct must be subjected to heightened scrutiny.  
Thus, Part IV argues that both decisions were incorrect for the reasons 
explained below. 
A. Bankruptcy Is a System of Individualized Exemptions 
First, Smith’s various holdings may provide a basis for heightening 
the level of scrutiny involved in estate determinations.  While Smith has 
been referred to as the “death of free exercise[,]”94 commentators often 
forget that Smith recognized two exceptions to its otherwise infamous 
holding.95 
The first exception, often referred to as the hybrid rights claim, 
occurs when a plaintiff can connect a religious liberty claim to another 
constitutional right.96  The second exception provides a heightened level 
                                                 
93 Id. at 325. 
94 Stephen L. Carter, Essay, The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1627, 
1628 n.5 (1997) (“[S]ome scholars have pessimistically declared the death of free exercise of 
religion.”) (citing Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle:  Making 
Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 407 (1994) (arguing that 
further application of the reasoning in recent Supreme Court cases would “render the Free 
Exercise Clause virtually judicially dead” for minority religious practices); Michael W. 
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 140 (1992) (arguing that 
the neutrality principle incorrectly places “the freedom of citizens to exercise their 
faith . . . [at the mercy of the] vagaries of democratic politics . . . .”); Karen T. White, The 
Court-Created Conflict of the First Amendment: Marginalizing Religion and Undermining the Law, 
6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 186 (1994) (“In an effort to enforce government neutrality, 
the Court has rendered the Free Exercise Clause almost meaningless.”)). 
95 The holding in Smith was qualified by the United States Supreme Court in Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  The Lukumi decision 
narrowed the Smith holding to the extent that neutral laws of general applicability, not 
enacted with hostility or malice towards a particular religious group, will be upheld regardless of 
the severity of the burden imposed on one’s religious practice.  Evidence of such hostility 
or malice employed by a legislative body toward a particular group of believers would 
need to be supported by evidence in the record. 
96 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).  In 
Smith, the Court cited Yoder as an example of a parental right claim being combined with a 
free exercise claim to satisfy the ‘hybrid rights’ exception to Smith.  Id. 
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of scrutiny when “a system of individual exemptions[]” has been created 
to determine whether a particular individual is entitled to a secular 
benefit.97  To explain the meaning of this exception, the Court cited 
Sherbert as a perfect example of one such system.98  Similarly, the authors 
of this Article believe that the bankruptcy system is another example of a 
system of individualized exemptions. 
1. Defining a System of Individualized Exemptions 
As a preliminary matter, one must first determine what qualifies as a 
system of individualized exemptions.  The Supreme Court, with the 
exception of the Sherbert reference in Smith, has not defined this term.99  
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, but with Smith clearly in 
mind, a pair of recent federal courts of appeals cases have provided 
guidance on the issue. 
The first of these two opinions was issued by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of Blackhawk v. 
Pennsylvania.100  There, the court was faced with the question of whether 
the Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code, which allowed the Game 
Commission to grant exemptions from a permit fee necessary to keep 
wild animals in captivity, satisfied the definition of a system of 
individualized exemptions.101  Based on relevant portions of the 
Pennsylvania statute at issue, the Game Commission was provided the 
power to refrain from charging a permit fee to an applicant when the 
applicant’s posited activity provided “some other tangible benefit for the 
welfare and survival of Pennsylvania’s existing wildlife population[,]”102 
and when the purported use was “consistent with . . . the intent of [the 
Game and Wildlife Code][.]”103 
After reviewing this language, the court determined that the 
Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code created a system of 
individualized exemptions.104  Specifically, the court was persuaded by 
the fact that the language of the Game and Wildlife Code permitted 
exemptions when the purported use facilitated some benefit for 
Pennsylvania’s existing wildlife.105  The court concluded that the 
                                                 
97 Id. at 884. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004). 
101 Id. at 209. 
102 Id. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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regulation vested game officers with broad discretion to waive permit 
requirements.106  Armed with this discretion, the Game and Wildlife 
Code fostered “the opportunity” for a facially-neutral and generally-
applicable law to be applied in a discriminatory manner.107  Under such 
circumstances, Smith’s general rule did not apply.108 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also 
confronted a similar scenario.  In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,109 Christiana 
Axson-Flynn, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, sought an exemption from the University of Utah’s Actor 
Training Program (“ATP”).110  As part of the program, Axson-Flynn was 
asked to take roles that required her to say “‘goddamn’” and 
“‘fucking[,]’” words that she found religiously objectionable.111  At first, 
her instructors seemed receptive to her religiously-motivated objections, 
but eventually pressured her to abandon them.112  Based on this 
continued pressure, Axson-Flynn decided to withdraw from the 
program because she believed it was only a matter of time before she 
would be asked to leave.113  After her withdrawal from the program, 
Axson-Flynn brought suit against the university, alleging an 
infringement of her religious liberty.114   
In addressing her claim, the court considered the application of the 
individualized exemption doctrine to the ATP.  Specifically, it found that 
instructors in the program had previously granted exemptions from 
specific scenes to Axson-Flynn and another student on religious 
grounds.115  Based upon this, the court concluded that a question of fact 
was raised as to whether the ad hoc nature of ATP’s grants of 
exemptions created a system of individualized exemptions.116 
With this background in perspective, we contend that when the 
exception recognized in Smith is read together with the examples set 
forth in Blackhawk and Axson-Flynn, it becomes clear that these opinions 
accurately depict the proper criteria for a system of individualized 
exemptions.  In light of these facts, we propose the following simple, 
two-part test: 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 209. 
108 Id. at 210. 
109 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
110 Id. at 1281–83. 
111 Id. at 1281–82. 
112 Id. at 1282. 
113 Id. at 1283. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1298–99. 
116 Id. at 1299. 
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To prove that a system of individualized exemptions exists, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that:  (1) there is a high level of 
discretion vested in the government officer at issue, and (2) 
there is some level of individualized inquiry into the reasoning 
behind the applicant’s exemption request. 
To understand the origins of the first part of this test, one should 
review the issue before the Blackhawk court.  In particular, the reader 
should carefully review the Third Circuit’s critique of the broad 
discretion granted to game officers whereby those officers could exempt 
anyone from the Game Code if the proposed animal use was consistent 
with the purposes of the Code.117   
In addition, in order to understand the second prong of the test, the 
reader should review the practices of the ATP in Axson-Flynn.  In that 
case, the program instructors questioned Axson-Flynn and the other 
student who sought an exemption from the program on religious 
grounds about the religious nature of that request.  After reviewing the 
nature of the exemption requests, the instructor had the authority to 
grant or deny these requests.  To the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, this was a persuasive fact that supported its conclusion that a 
question of fact was created by the ad hoc nature of ATP’s grants of 
exemptions.118 
2. Applying Our Two-Part Test to Bankruptcy 
In the context of bankruptcy proceedings, courts should adopt a 
three-step analysis.  First, they should determine the identity of the 
government official making the exemption determinations.  Second, they 
should determine the level of discretion that the identified official 
possesses.  Third, they should consider the individualized nature of the 
inquiry that the official undertakes when rendering decisions.  We will 
address each step in turn. 
In bankruptcy, the government decision makers are bankruptcy 
judges.119  After all, the judges are the individuals who apply the 
necessary body of law and reach what they consider to be a just outcome 
in each case.120  Although bankruptcy judges are not the typical 
                                                 
117 Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 2004). 
118 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1281–83 (noting that during the admission process, potential 
students were asked about possible objections to assigned coursework). 
119 Judge Patricia C. Williams decided the Washington case.  Judge Elizabeth Perris 
decided the Oregon case. 
120 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (upholding a bankruptcy court’s 
exercise of equitable power to toll the statute of limitations on a tax debt). 
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governmental decision maker under a traditional Free Exercise analysis, 
the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer reminds us that judges are not 
new subjects of constitutional scrutiny and can properly be labeled as 
joint participants with the government to satisfy the requirement of 
governmental action under the First Amendment.121 
3. The Question of Discretion:  Bankruptcy Courts Are Courts of Equity 
but What Does That Mean When the Debtor Is a Religious Entity?   
In the second step of our analysis, a review of the bankruptcy system 
and past decisions demonstrates that bankruptcy judges possess a high 
level of discretion.  This discretion appears historically justified in view 
of the fact it has long been a maxim of bankruptcy law that bankruptcy 
courts are courts of equity.122  Although the equitable powers of the 
bankruptcy court have never been precisely defined, an early illustration 
of the broad interpretation of this phrase is presented in Pepper v. 
Litton.123 
In Pepper, the Court addressed a controlling stockholder’s attempt to 
defraud his corporation’s creditors through a scheme to have his 
judgment lien paid first from the corporation’s assets.124  The bankruptcy 
court directly disallowed this scheme by subordinating the stockholder’s 
claim to that of other creditors.125  The controlling stockholder 
appealed.126 
In writing for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas broadly declared 
that “for many purposes ‘courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of 
equity, and their proceedings [are] inherently proceedings in equity.’”127  
Continuing, Justice Douglas wrote  
Among the granted powers are the allowance and 
disallowance of claims; the collection and distribution of 
the estates of bankrupts and the determination of 
controversies in relation thereto; the rejection in whole 
or in part “according to the equities of the case” of 
claims previously allowed; and the entering of such 
                                                 
121 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that where a judicial officer enforced 
a private, racially-restrictive covenant there was a denial of equal protection). 
122 Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy:  Judicial Lawmaking in a 
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2006). 
123 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
124 Id. at 297–99. 
125 Id. at 296. 
126 Id. at 302. 
127 Id. at 304 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934). 
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judgments “as may be necessary for the enforcement of 
the provisions” of the act.128 
Furthermore, he urged that “substance will not give way to 
form[.] . . . [T]echnical considerations will not prevent substantial justice 
from being done.”129  Essentially, Justice Douglas supported carte 
blanche power for bankruptcy courts to do “substantial justice[.]”130  
After applying those principles to the case before him, Justice Douglas 
upheld the bankruptcy court’s practice of equitable subordination.131  In 
strong language, Justice Douglas called it “the duty of the bankruptcy 
court” to undo the scheme that the controlling stockholder created.132  
Thus, within the context of these principles, he approved the bankruptcy 
court’s practice of undoing a fully-perfected lien without having any 
express authority to do so.133  This example shows that bankruptcy 
courts not only have the authority to deny a particular governmental 
benefit, but also possess the power to redefine a party’s pre-existing 
rights.  This breadth of discretion far exceeds that which was exercised in 
either Blackhawk or Axson-Flynn. 
4. What About Individualized Inquiry:  How Personal Do Bankruptcy 
Courts Get? 
In addressing the third part of the inquiry, it would be intellectually 
dishonest to argue that bankruptcy judges do not engage in a significant 
level of individualized inquiry prior to rendering decisions.  There are 
several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, particularly in Chapter 11, 
that require a court to review the reasons behind the actor’s proposed 
course of conduct.134  As announced in Smith, the controlling test 
requires that the government assess “the reasons for the relevant 
conduct[]” and that a “good cause” standard is sufficient to “create[] a 
mechanism for individualized exemptions.”135 
Proponents of applying a similar standard to bankruptcy decisions 
need not search any further than section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code to 
                                                 
128 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
129 Id. at 305. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 312. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 7 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 1100.01 (noting bankruptcy courts’ 
considerable discretion in evaluating a debtor’s use of property, borrowing of funds, and 
other business decisions). 
135 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878, 884 (1990) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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find government inquiries that mirror the good cause standard.136  One 
illustration of such an inquiry occurs under the necessity of payment 
doctrine—which is supported by the bankruptcy court’s section 105 
powers.137  In short, this doctrine requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the 
existence of a “compelling business justification, other than mere 
appeasement of a major creditor[]” to validate pre-plan payment of a 
pre-petition obligation.138 
For instance, in In re NVR L.P., a Chapter 11 debtor wanted to make 
early payments to a former employee and highly-regarded consultant.139  
As a basis for its proposed action, the debtor stated that it feared that the 
former employee would no longer recognize his obligation under the 
non-solicitation clause, which was part of the parties’ original 
employment contract.140  To address this concern, the debtor proposed to 
pay the former employee an overdue bonus, but general creditors 
objected to this payment.141 
In reviewing the parties’ dispute, the court concluded that the threat 
posed by the former employee’s potential dishonor of the non-
solicitation agreement was not a serious impediment to the Chapter 11 
process.142  In so holding, it noted that the debtor’s claim was “too 
remote and speculative to justify” payment under the above-mentioned 
doctrine.143  Simply stated, the court found an inadequate business basis 
to justify immediate payment.144 
In comparison to the good cause standard, the analysis under the 
necessity of payment doctrine is nearly identical.  The only difference 
between the standards employed is the exact wording of the inquiry.  In 
Smith, the Court conceded that the good cause standard invites a system 
of “individualized exemptions.”145  In In re NVR L.P., the court utilized a 
similar standard that can be characterized as a “good business reason” 
test.146  Despite the different wording, these tests ultimately focus on the 
same point.  In essence, the government wants to determine whether 
                                                 
136 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2005) (stating that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title[]”). 
137 NORTON, supra note 55, at § 13.8 (citing Miltenberger v. Logansport C. & S.W.R. Co., 
106 U.S. 286 (1882)). 
138 In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992). 
139 Id. at 127. 
140 Id. at 128. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 128. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
146 In re NVR L.P., 127 B.R. at 128. 
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there is a good reason for the private party’s proposed conduct.147  Under 
either test, the third step of our proposed analysis is satisfied.  Because 
bankruptcy is a system of individualized exemptions, strict scrutiny 
should be applied to the process of liquidation when bankruptcy courts 
consider church property issues. 
B. City of Boerne v. Flores:  RFRA’s Application to Bankruptcy Is 
Constitutional Even When State Law Standards Are Applied 
This portion of the article is subdivided in several categories.  First, 
Part IV.B reviews the relevant post-Flores decisions.  Second, the Flores 
rationales are examined and applied to bankruptcy.  Finally, Part IV.B 
discusses the source of Congress’s extended power in bankruptcy to 
make religious freedom decisions. 
RFRA applies to bankruptcy decisions even when state law provides 
the governing standard.148  The Oregon Bankruptcy Court directly 
questioned the validity of this theory based on the notion that in order to 
decide section 541 issues, bankruptcy judges have to apply state law, and 
RFRA is void as to those laws.149  Implicitly, the court raised a 
constitutional objection to the application of RFRA to state law 
determinations.150  A proper review of Flores, post-Flores decisions, and 
the special features of the Bankruptcy Clause, suggest that this 
conclusion is in error. 
From the outset, the circumstances under which a constitutional 
challenge to RFRA’s application in bankruptcy could arise must be set 
forth.  To properly understand this context, one must reconsider the role 
of the bankruptcy judge in these proceedings.  Recall that a bankruptcy 
judge applies both federal and state law in rendering his or her 
                                                 
147 Compare In re NVR L.P., 127 B.R. at 128, with Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
148 Vill. of Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 457 F.3d 52, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“RFRA’s 
compelling interest test remained in effect as to the federal government.”); O’Bryan v. 
Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We have in the past left open the 
question whether the RFRA may be applied to the internal operations of the national 
government.  Today we join the other circuits and hold that it may be so applied.”) (citation 
omitted); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that RFRA was 
applicable in the “federal realm.”); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959–60 (10th Cir. 
2001) (“The invalid portion of RFRA does not alter the structure of RFRA, it simply 
prevents the application of the statute to a certain class of defendants.”); In re Young, 141 
F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding RFRA constitutional as applied to bankruptcy law). 
149 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 860–61 (Bankr. D. 
Or. 2005). 
150 Id. at 861. 
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decisions.151  In fact, the Bankruptcy Code instructs a judge to review 
state law in a number of core bankruptcy areas.152   
On the other hand, a closer examination of the duty to apply both 
state and federal law reveals a potential conflict.  One should recall that 
Flores invalidated RFRA as applied to state actors applying state law.153  
In view of the United States Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,154 it is clear that the post-
Flores RFRA decisions which held RFRA enforceable against federal 
actors applying federal law155 were rightly decided.  Therefore, a conflict 
is apparent because a federal actor—the bankruptcy judge—must apply 
state law in the discharge of his federal duties.156  This point strikes a 
balance between Flores and post-Flores decisions.157  
1. Post-Flores Case Law 
This conflict, however, can be resolved in examining the rationale 
underlying In re Young,158 the first United States Court of Appeals 
decision to be issued in the wake of Flores.159  In Young, two religious 
adherents tithed ten percent of their annual income to their church.160  
This practice continued when the two filed for protection under Chapter 
                                                 
151 Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 635–36 
(2004) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code in over fifty locations refers to non-bankruptcy 
law, applicable law, state law, or local law; in addition, noting that the two most important 
terms in the Bankruptcy Code, “‘property of the estate’” and “‘creditor[,]’” are defined by 
nonbankruptcy law). 
152 Id. 
153 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
154 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (upholding RFRA against federal actors applying federal law). 
155 Vill. of Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 457 F.3d 52, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2006); O’Bryan 
v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 
1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Young, 
141 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 1998). 
156 Plank, supra note 151, at 635–36. 
157 See id. at 635–36. 
158 In re Young, 141 F.3d at 854. 
159 See Susan D. Franck, Comment, Christians v. Chrystal Evangelical Free Church:  
Interpreting RFRA in the Battle Among God, the Government, and the Bankruptcy Code, 81 MINN. 
L. REV. 981, 983 (1997) (“The Eighth Circuit is the first circuit court to evaluate the 
application of RFRA in relation to tithing, bankruptcy, and fraudulent conveyance law.”) 
(citing In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1416 (8th Cir. 1996)).  See Iru C. Lupu, The Case Against 
Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 587–588 n.90 (1990) 
(“Bankruptcy legislation enacted in 1998 provides religion-neutral protection for gifts by 
insolvent debtors to charitable institutions, including religious entities.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(2)(1994)).  While the tithing question has since been resolved, the RFRA 
considerations at issue have not.  Id. 
160 In re Young, 141 F.3d. at 857. 
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7 of the Bankruptcy Code.161  At that point, the bankruptcy trustee 
sought to avoid the Youngs’s pre-petition tithes under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(2)(A), the fraudulent-conveyance provision of the Code.162  In 
response, the church that received the tithes, and was now being sued, 
raised a defense to such action based on RFRA.163  The Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that RFRA applied to this federal law.164 
In attempting to understand this holding, some emphasis should be 
placed on the court’s conclusion.165  The court explicitly declared “we 
conclude that, under the Bankruptcy Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause of Article I of the Constitution, RFRA is constitutional as 
applied to federal law.”166  Despite this broad statement, the Young court 
did not openly address the issue of whether its holding would extend to 
Code provisions that apply state law.167  Nevertheless, this opinion 
clearly demonstrates the foresight of several circuits in enforcing RFRA 
against the federal government prior to the Gonzalez decision.168 
In reaching its decision, the Young court first noted the distinct 
holding of Flores in comparison with the precise issue before it.169  On 
this point, the court stated that Flores dealt with Congress’s remedial 
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not Congress’s 




164 Id. at 861 (“We conclude that RFRA is an appropriate means by Congress to modify 
the United States bankruptcy laws. . . .  RFRA, however, has effectively amended the 
Bankruptcy Code, and has engrafted the additional clause to § 548(a)(2)(A) that a recovery 
that places a substantial burden on a debtor’s exercise of religion will not be allowed unless 
it is the least restrictive means to satisfy a compelling governmental interest.”) (citation 
omitted). 
165 For example, the Court stated that “[t]he key to the separation of powers issue [here] 
is . . . not whether Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis, 
but whether Congress acted beyond the scope of its constitutional authority in applying 
RFRA to federal law.”  Id. at 860. 
166 Id. at 856. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 860; Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Likewise, we do not 
see how, by enacting RFRA for the federal sphere, Congress violates the separation of 
powers doctrine.  The sweeping language used in Boerne derived from the Court’s 
discussion of Congress’s exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, but 
when Congress is acting pursuant to its plenary power, it has the ability, and duty, to 
legislate according to its own interpretation of the Constitution.”) (citation omitted); 
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2001) (“These separation of powers 
concerns the Court expressed in Flores, however, do not apply to RFRA as applied to the 
federal government.  Congress’[s] power to apply RFRA to the federal government comes 
not from its ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment but rather from its Article I 
powers.”). 
169 In re Young, 141 F.3d at 858–59. 
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bankruptcy power.170  More importantly, the court stated that Flores 
positively reflected the conclusion that Congress had its own spheres of 
authority where it maintained dominion to determine controlling 
constitutional principles.171 
In addition, the Young court also focused on Congress’s broad intent 
in protecting religious liberty when it enacted RFRA.172  Here, the court 
stated that such broad intent demonstrates that Congress wanted to 
maintain RFRA’s validity as to the federal government, even if it did not 
apply to state governments.173  To the Young court, the combination of 
Congress’s broad intent and its bankruptcy power provided a basis to 
conclude that RFRA still applied to the federal government;174 Gonzalez 
later confirmed the Young court’s prescient intuition. 
In applying this reasoning, the Young court eluded to the Flores 
Court’s separation of powers rationale by asserting that the true issue in 
separation of powers cases is not that Congress’s opinion of Free 
Exercise differed from the Court’s, but that Congress had constitutional 
authority to enact RFRA as to the federal government.175  In dealing with 
Flores, based on this distinction, the court held that Congress had full 
authority to apply RFRA to bankruptcy proceedings.176 
In sum, the Young court articulated two points.  First, it stated that 
Flores’ separation of powers rationale did not extend to areas in which 
Congress had final constitutional authority.177  Second, it reasoned that 
Congress’s plenary power over bankruptcy provided it with the 
requisite authority to amend bankruptcy law by passing RFRA without 
actually amending the Bankruptcy Code.178 
In viewing the second rationale, it may appear that its natural 
extension is the untenable proposition that Congress, upon taking broad 
remedial action, effectively amends every area of federal law controlled 
under the scope of its Article I powers.179  Initially, this assertion may 
seem contradictory considering Congress’s purported source of 
authority for RFRA and the intrinsic nature of Federalism which 
mandates that Congress operate as a creature constrained by the 
                                                 
170 Id. 
171 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (“When Congress acts within its 
sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own 
informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”). 
172 In re Young, 141 F.3d at 859. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 860. 
176 Id. at 861. 
177 Id. at 860. 
178 Id. at 861. 
179 See id. 
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principles of limited government.180  It is this Article’s position, however, 
that this apparent contradiction is resolved when one reconciles Young 
with other relevant case law. 
For example, the case of In re Hodge181 arises from the same factual 
circumstance as Young.  In Hodge, a Chapter 7 trustee attempted to avoid 
pre-petition tithes to the debtor’s church as fraudulent conveyances.182  
Again, the court rejected this argument.183  In its opinion, the court 
reasoned that Congress had the authority to amend the Bankruptcy 
Code and other specific areas of federal law.184  It stated that no one 
would challenge the assertion that Congress could individually amend 
each federal statute if it so desired.185  In respect of that power, the court 
found no justification to prevent Congress from accomplishing, in a 
comprehensive manner, what it could effectuate on a per-statute basis.186  
Thus, the Hodge court augmented Young’s holding by adding the 
principle that Congress can fail to state certain authority to support its 
enactment of legislation and still apply that legislation in the exercise of 
its enumerated Article I powers.187 
                                                 
180 H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (stating that Congress has the constitutional authority 
to enact H.R. 1308 [RFRA].  Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the 
legislative branch has been given the authority to provide statutory protection for a 
constitutional value when the Supreme Court has been unwilling to assert its authority).  In 
reviewing the above language, one should notice that the only Article I clause cited as 
support for RFRA’s enactment is the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Perhaps, Congress 
might have been better positioned to enact RFRA if they had identified the specific Article I 
powers involved.  If Congress had done so, an argument would exist that the result in 
Boerne should mirror the result in McCulloch v. Maryland.  In that case, the congressional 
action of establishing national banks was declared constitutional because the litigants could 
relate the subject legislation to additional Article I powers besides the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  The powers involved were:  the taxing power, the borrowing power, the 
spending power, and the power to raise and support an army.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316, 364 (1819). 
181 220 B.R. 386, 389 (D. Idaho 1998). 
182 Id. at 389. 
183 Id. at 398 (“The question of constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not 
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.  Regardless of the absence 
of such recitals in a statute’s legislative history, it will be upheld so long as Congress had 





187 Id.  Under these standards, it is certainly within the power of Congress under the 
Bankruptcy Clause to amend the Bankruptcy Code to ensure that it provides the level of 
protection th[at] Congress deems adequate for free-exercise rights.  Id.  Accordingly, the 
Court holds that RFRA, as applied in this instance, is a proper exercise of Congress’s power 
under the Bankruptcy Clause.  Id. 
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2. The Attack on Flores 
Apart from the post-Flores decisions cited above, a proper factual 
perspective, a proper reading of Flores, and thoughtful consideration of 
the unique nature of the Bankruptcy Clause support the application of 
RFRA to bankruptcy law.  First, it cannot be disputed that as a matter of 
fact, a bankruptcy judge is a federal actor, regardless of whether the 
court is charged with the task of applying federal or state law.188  To 
accept the idea that a bankruptcy judge somehow transforms from a 
federal to state actor by applying state law is to basically accept the 
argument that a traditional Article III judge becomes a non-federal actor 
when he or she applies state law in diversity cases.189  Instead, it is easier 
to concede that the judge is a federal actor who is just facilitating federal 
duties through the use of state law.190 
This conclusion is supported by consideration of Flores and its 
potential application to bankruptcy.  In Flores, Justice Kennedy focused 
both on federalism and separation of powers issues.191  Justice Kennedy 
briefly expressed concern about the burden that RFRA would place on 
the state actor’s inherent right to regulate its citizens, and that Congress 
had essentially abrogated the Marbury power by creating a statutory 
cause of action.192  However, our assertion is that these two rationales do 
not present the same problem in bankruptcy. 
First, federalism does not bar RFRA’s application.  In reaching this 
conclusion, Justice Kennedy’s articulated federalism protest to RFRA 
must be considered.  On this point, he wrote that RFRA “would require 
searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of 
invalidation.  This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the 
States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate . . . their 
citizens.”193  A fair reading of this passage reveals that Justice Kennedy’s 
                                                 
188 See Plank, supra note 151, at 633–36. 
189 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 398 (2006) (articulating the Erie doctrine, which holds 
that a federal judge is required to apply substantive rights provided by state law when 
deciding state-law claims).   
190 A perfect example of this principle is found in further examination of the Erie 
Doctrine.  For instance, if a case involves a federal interest of the highest order, an Article 
III judge is required to apply federal substantive law when deciding diversity cases—even 
if the cause of action involved is based solely on state law.  Id.  Similar to Article III judges, 
the bankruptcy court often uses its equitable powers to craft supreme federal law.  Levitin, 
supra note 122, at 78–82 (collecting examples of the bankruptcy court using its equitable 
power to create federal common law). 
191 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Broad as the power of Congress is 
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital 
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”). 
192 Id. at 533–36. 
193 Id. at 534. 
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main concern was the administrative burden that RFRA places on state 
regulatory schemes.194 
However, this concern does not extend to bankruptcy because 
Congress’s regulatory scheme is burdened by RFRA, not the scheme of a 
particular state.195  Section 541 is a perfect example of this principle 
because, under that section, if a debtor successfully excludes property 
from the bankruptcy estate, the Bankruptcy Code’s fundamental aim of 
centralizing the debtor’s property interests, rather than a state’s interest, 
is undermined.196  Therefore, RFRA poses no threat to state regulatory 
schemes. 
In addition, separation of powers does not present an obstacle to the 
application of RFRA to bankruptcy cases.  This assertion derives from 
Congress’s unique powers over bankruptcy law.197  Just as the Young 
court noted, Congress has plenary authority over this matter and can 
dictate controlling standards within it.198   
Further, there is a unique history behind the Bankruptcy Power that 
supports the construction of a different relationship between Congress 
and the judiciary.199  Thus, the final pages of this Article articulate the 
significant reasons why bankruptcy proceedings present this unique 
relationship. 
3. Constitutional Support for Considering Congress More Powerful 
Under the Bankruptcy Clause  
The investigation into constitutional support for this altered 
relationship begins at the relevant constitutional text.  Article I, § 8, cl. 4 
of the United States Constitution provides:  “Congress shall have 
power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States[.]”200  In reviewing this provision, it is 
important to note the exact language used and how that language 
implicates a powerful congressional status.  Specifically, the reader 
                                                 
194 See id. 
195 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
196 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 541.01. 
197 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (“The power of Congress to establish 
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States is unrestricted 
and paramount.”). 
198 In Re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
941 (1983)). 
199 Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power:  Why Bankruptcy is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 129, 129 (2003) (arguing that Congress has a broader power under the Bankruptcy 
Clause to abrogate sovereign immunity than other Article I powers).   
200 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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should pay attention to words such as “to establish” and “uniform[.]”201  
Together, these words suggest that the Constitution contemplates 
Congress’s role in bankruptcy to be more active than that of a mere 
regulator; rather, the Constitution imbues Congress with express rule-
making power.202 
A review of the language of the Commerce Clause supports this 
assertion.  This Clause, located just one provision above the Bankruptcy 
Clause, provides:  Congress shall “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States[.]”203  Comparing this text with 
the Bankruptcy Clause, there is an obvious difference between the two.204  
In dealing with commerce, the Framers stated a clear intention that 
Congress act as a regulator by using the word “regulate[,]”205 while the 
Framers used much stronger language when defining the Congressional 
Bankruptcy Power.206  To disregard this contrast, in light of the reality 
that the Framers contemporaneously constructed both powers,207 is to 
accept the proposition that powers located only a clause apart from each 
other, with markedly different language, grant the same scope of 
authority.208 
In addition to the constitutional text, further support for a broad 
bankruptcy power can be located in the unique purpose and history of 
bankruptcy law.  Unlike other Article I powers, bankruptcy was 
intended to be an exclusively federal field.209  In part, this exclusivity was 
                                                 
201 Id. 
202 Haines, supra note 199, at 166–67. 
203 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
204 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3–4. 
205 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
206 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
207 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 221 (James Madison) (Gideon ed. 2001).  James Madison 
stated that  
[t]he power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so 
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will 
prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or 
be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems not 
likely to be drawn into question. 
Id.  As the Madison passage demonstrates, the Founder’s understanding of the relationship 
between the bankruptcy and commerce powers, in addition to their choice of different 
language in defining these powers, signifies that the two powers are to be interpreted 
differently.  Naturally, given the powerful language of the Bankruptcy Clause, our 
argument is that this clause be subject to a broad interpretation. 
208 Even the father of judicial review, John Marshall, noted the distinctive text of the 
Bankruptcy Clause.  See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 193–94 (1819) (“The peculiar 
terms of the [bankruptcy clause] certainly deserve notice.  Congress is not authorized 
merely to pass laws, the operation of which shall be uniform, but to establish uniform laws 
on the subject throughout the United States.”). 
209 Levitin, supra note 122, at 71–72. 
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necessary where the Framer’s could not garner enough full faith and 
credit to ensure that the colonies would respect one another’s insolvency 
laws.210  This conflict arose when one colony granted a debtor a 
discharge from his obligations and another colony would imprison the 
discharged debtor for failure to pay debts to its citizens.211  To provide 
uniformity, the Framers, through the Constitution, empowered 
Congress, via the Bankruptcy Clause, to pave the way for matters of 
insolvency to be decided exclusively in the federal courts.212 
Early on, Congress used this power in a unique manner.  For 
example, immediately after the Constitution was adopted, Congress 
granted federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to 
release debtors from state prisons.213  In comparison, the habeas right 
was not offered to other state prisoners for another half century.214  This 
historical point is important because it demonstrates the flexibility that 
Congress possesses in exercising its bankruptcy power.215 
As a final point, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a 
stronger congressional role in bankruptcy law.  For instance, in Central 
Virginia Community College v. Katz,216 the Court deferred a valuable 
constitutional question to congressional discretion.  In Katz, various state 
institutions were sued for receiving preferential transfers from an 
insolvent debtor.217  Later, when that same debtor filed for bankruptcy, 
the United State’s Trustee initiated a suit to recover the payments 
already distributed.218  The state institutions raised a sovereign immunity 
defense.219  However, the Court rejected this defense.220 
In reviewing the Court’s decision, the final paragraph of the 
majority’s opinion is worthy of discussion.  There, Justice Stevens stated: 
Congress may, at its option, either treat States in the 
same way as other creditors insofar as concerns “Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies” or exempt them from 
                                                 
210 See Haines, supra note 199, at 152–57. 
211 Id. at 155. 
212 Id. at 156. 
213 Central Virginia. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1002–03 (2006) (“[I]t [America’s 
bankruptcy law] specifically granted federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas 
corpus effective to release debtors from state prisons.”). 
214 Id. at 1003. 
215 See Haines, supra note 199, at 152–57. 
216 Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005 (holding that the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I abrogates state 
sovereign immunity). 
217 Id. at 994. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 995. 
220 Id. at 1002. 
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operation of such laws.  Its power to do so arises from 
the Bankruptcy Clause itself; the relevant “abrogation” 
is the one effected in the plan of the Convention, not by 
statute.221 
A thorough reading of this passage reveals that the Court deferred 
the sovereign immunity question, one traditionally determined by the 
judiciary,222 to Congressional discretion.223  This deference to Congress 
demonstrates that the Court was receptive to the position that Congress 
has the power to decide matters of constitutional law in the bankruptcy 
setting.224 
Second, it is also significant that the Court derived its decision from 
the construction of the Constitution.225  The Court implied that the 
founding document vests Congress with controlling constitutional 
authority in this area.226  In other words, the Court recognized that 
Congress is the constitutional head of matters concerning bankruptcy 
law.227 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In summation, there are two cognizable grounds to support the 
assertion that bankruptcy judges must apply heightened scrutiny to 
church property decisions.  First, the bankruptcy court itself is a system 
of individualized exemptions in which a governmental decision maker, 
the bankruptcy judge, is vested with wide discretion to grant exemptions 
to certain individuals.  Second, RFRA is valid in its application to the 
federal government even when a judge utilizes state law in the 
effectuation of federal duties.  The fact that federal judges may be called 
                                                 
221 Id. at 1005. 
222 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (1996) (citations omitted) (citing 
the origins of the Court’s sovereign immunity doctrine). 
223 See Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. (“[Congress’s] power to [abrogate sovereign immunity] arises from the Bankruptcy 
Clause itself; the relevant ‘abrogation’ is the one effected in the plan of the Convention, not 
by statute.”). 
226 See id. 
227 See Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1002.  As additional support for its holding, the Katz Court relied 
on the core nature of a preference action to bankruptcy proceedings stating, “Petitioners do 
not dispute that that authority[, power of bankruptcy courts to avoid preferences,] has been 
a core aspect of the administration of bankrupt estates since at least the 18th century.”  Id.  
The authors would assert that this statement buttresses the theory that decisions in other 
core areas of bankruptcy, such as what interests of the debtor are included in the estate 
property under 11 U.S.C. § 541, must also be within Congress’s final constitutional 
discretion. 
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upon to apply state law is not a compelling reason to prevent the 
application of RFRA to bankruptcy judges.  Arguments to the contrary 
negate the very nature of Congress’s broad powers under the 
Bankruptcy Clause. 
In closing, the authors recognize that some people may be reluctant 
to extend strong protection to the Roman Catholic Church—or any 
religious entity—in view of the circumstances that surround the entity’s 
bankruptcy proceedings.  However, the factual predicate of this case 
must not confuse our legal thought.  Here, bankruptcy courts have been 
presented with bona fide debtors constrained by the mistakes of their 
past.  This is exactly the type of case the bankruptcy system was 
designed to address. 
Ultimately, the aforementioned proposal is preferable because it 
allows the entity to attain the benefits of this system without requiring it 
to sacrifice all semblances of internal autonomy.  In any event, if dioceses 
are forced to cease operations, it is not the entity that will be most 
harshly affected; rather, it is the entity’s congregation who will no longer 
be able to fulfill the mission of that organization which will bear the 
brunt of these potential distributions.  Considering the number of people 
who would be affected if a diocese was required to distribute all its 
assets to satisfy debts, it makes sense for a tort-creditor to bear the 
burden of proving a compelling justification for enforcing the debt 
before he or she holds a great number of innocent individuals 
responsible for the harm caused by a few. 
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